Strengthening Military Theory with Chinese Characteristics: The CCP’s Next-Gen Doctrine for Warfighting Superiority

LJ Eads

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is sharpening its focus on the modernization of both military theory and cognitive warfare doctrine. These efforts, seemingly distinct, are in fact complementary. Where “weaponized communication” (武器化传播) and “cognitive warfare” (认知战) target perceptions, ideologies, and global narratives, “strengthening military theory work” (军事理论工作) focuses on the internal intellectual architecture of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Together, they reveal a comprehensive strategy: a Party-led push to dominate both the mental and material domains of future conflict.

A new PLA course designed for all PLA Officers, 《全面加强新时代新征程军事理论工作》 (Comprehensively Strengthening Military Theory Work on the New Journey in the New Era, December 2024), was issued as a direct implementation of Xi Jinping’s instructions at the All-Military Military Theory Work Conference (全军军事理论工作会议) held in Beijing in October 2024. The course reflects Xi’s emphasis that military theory modernization is a leading driver of national defense modernization and central to achieving the PLA’s 2035 and 2049 goals. Subsequent writings, such as the PLA’s Military Digest’s 2025 feature “Looking Back at the Causes and Consequences of World Wars, Gaining Insight into New Risks”, show how the conference’s directives have cascaded into follow-on research linking historical lessons to future intelligentized warfare.

1. Theoretical Modernization as a Driver of Military Reform

The course makes clear that military theory modernization (军事理论现代化) is a leading component of national defense modernization, not an afterthought. Xi Jinping’s directive stresses adapting theory to the “three changes” (科技之变, 战争之变, 对手之变—changes in technology, warfare, and adversaries). This mirrors how CCP propaganda scholars demand that information theory adapt to the “algorithm era.” In both cases, the Party insists on a distinctly Chinese system—a 中国特色现代军事理论体系 (A modern military theoretical system with Chinese characteristics) for the PLA, and a China-centered discourse structure for information dominance.

2. Responding to Global Military Transformations

The course situates PLA theory work within the broader new military revolution (新军事革命):

• Informationized and intelligentized warfare (信息化、智能化战争)

• New domains—space, cyber, AI, biotech

• The generation of “new quality combat power” (新质战斗力)

This “leapfrog” approach parallels CCP doctrine in the information domain. Just as scholars like Zhang Zheng and Huang Junjun (2025) call for restructuring global communication flows to bypass Western narratives, the PLA seeks to bypass U.S. military advantages in legacy force-on-force domains by accelerating theory-driven integration of disruptive technologies.

3. Institutionalizing “War-Centric” Research

Xi Jinping’s reminder that “the army is built to fight wars” anchors the course. Theory is framed as a problem-solving instrument—addressing deterrence, escalation, war termination, joint operations, and rapid technology-to-force conversion. This same war-centric pragmatism appears in information warfare texts: Guo Xiaoan and Kang Rushi (2025) frame communication not as dialogue but as a combat vector, advocating proactive narrative offense. In both military and media spheres, CCP theory is being redesigned to anticipate and shape the next battle, not merely respond to it.

4. Integration of Theory, Technology, and Talent

The PLA course highlights 理技融合 (theory-technology fusion), applying AI, big data, and simulations to doctrinal modeling. It also emphasizes the cultivation of a 人才方阵 (talent phalanx)—officers and theorists who can bridge operations with science. This mirrors the CCP’s weaponized communication research, where algorithmic platforms are described as “cognitive architectures” that must be engineered and governed ideologically. In both realms, the Party is fusing theory, technology, and talent into dual-use ecosystems, blending civilian expertise into military and propaganda pipelines.

5. Mechanisms for Theory-to-Practice Conversion

The course stresses 转化运用 (translation and application)—theory must flow into doctrine, tactics, training, and procurement. Platforms, incentives, and a “theory marketplace” are proposed to accelerate uptake. Similarly, CCP research on communication calls for computational discourse simulations (Shen Hao, Yao Zhaopu, and Lei Min, 2025) and automated deployment of synthetic agents (Ma Liming and Chen Qing, 2025) to operationalize propaganda in real time. In both contexts, theory is meaningless without mechanisms of rapid conversion into practice.

6. Strategic Context

Both the military theory campaign and the weaponized communication doctrine are situated within the 百年未有之大变局—a once-in-a-century transformation of global order. For the PLA, this means codifying Xi Jinping’s “Strong Military Thought” to guide the force through its 2035 and 2049 milestones. For propaganda theorists, it means ensuring network ideology sovereignty (网络意识形态主权) and dominating global discourse ecosystems. Both are direct responses to U.S. and allied strategies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Both are also ideological projects, rooting innovation in Marxist principles and Chinese cultural tradition to differentiate CCP doctrine from Western models.

Conclusion: Theory as Weapon, Doctrine as Battlefield

When read together, the CCP’s texts on military theory modernization and weaponized communication reveal a unified strategic logic. Theory is not treated as abstract scholarship; it is weaponized as an accelerant of power. Whether in the barracks or in the algorithm, CCP theorists are designing systems that:

1. Fuse political guidance with technology,

2. Convert abstract principles into operational tools, and

3. Ensure theory modernizes faster than that of any rival.

Where the West often sees doctrine as reactive, deriving from lessons of past wars, the CCP is positioning theory itself as the lead variable in great power competition. In its vision, wars of the future will not be won solely by missiles, satellites, or networks, but by the side whose theory fuses deepest with technology, translates fastest into practice, and commands both the cognitive and kinetic battlefields.

Comparative Note: CCP vs. U.S. Approaches

The contrast with the United States could not be sharper. U.S. initiatives like Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) are largely practice-driven, developed through experimentation, wargames, and lessons learned in Iraq, Afghanistan, and joint exercises. They are iterative, shaped by battlefield feedback. By contrast, the CCP treats theory as preemptive intellectual architecture—a system designed to guide how future wars should be fought before the conflict begins.

The U.S. emphasizes joint integration; China emphasizes theoretical acceleration. The U.S. experiments with networks and AI to solve practical bottlenecks; China elevates AI and big data into the very foundation of its doctrine. In short, Washington seeks to adapt, while Beijing seeks to pre-design.

This divergence matters: the PLA is trying to ensure that by the time a conflict erupts, its theory-driven doctrine will already have fused with emerging technologies and political goals…positioning China to fight on its own terms, in both the cognitive and kinetic domains.

References

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